

# **Hurricane Katrina Natural Disaster, Human Catastrophe**

August, 2006

By Eric Lotke and Robert L. Borosage

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## Executive Summary

One year after Hurricane Katrina, every facet of life on the Gulf Coast is marred by remnants of Hurricane Katrina and suffers from a response marked by unfulfilled promises, cronyism, waste, fraud, and abuse. This report shows how the government failed its people.

### **Failure to Prepare**

- A disaster expert said at the time that FEMA had been “systematically downgraded and all but dismantled.”
- Lessons of a five day disaster drill against the fictitious “Hurricane Pam” in 2003 were completely disregarded.
- Warnings about weak levees and diminished natural protection in wetlands and coastline were continuously ignored.
- The federal government failed its unique roll in providing security: disasters, by definition, exceed the capability of state and local authorities. In such cases, federal intervention is needed.

### **Failure to Respond**

- FEMA dispatched only 7 of its 28 search and rescue teams to the area before the storm hit and sent no additional rescue workers until after the hurricane had passed.
- FEMA stopped private citizens from assisting each other, insisting that aid flow through bureaucratic channels.

### **Failure to Rebuild**

- An estimated 278,000 workers have been displaced; 23% of whom remain unemployed.
- 100,000 households still live in FEMA trailers.
- Only 18% of FEMA contract dollars for Katrina and Rita reconstruction went to companies in the hardest hit states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. People with the greatest stake in reconstruction – and who are hungry for work – are being excluded from working in their own community.

The report connects these failures to the ideology of conservative governance:

- **Shrinking government:** until it is too small to act effectively.
- **Privatizing core functions:** placing blind faith in the market without oversight or accountability.
- **Pay-to-play politics:** in which money capitalism and personal gain count for more than performance.

# Hurricane Katrina

## Natural Disaster, Human Catastrophe

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Hurricane Katrina was a disaster. Part natural, part human. The natural destruction was horrific, but the human element – catastrophic incompetence on top of governmental unreadiness – multiplied the natural disaster into a human and moral catastrophe. The governmental failures were many and occurred at every level – federal, state and local. But given the scale of the natural devastation, the federal failure caused the most damage. The federal government failed to invest in sensible protective measures, outsourced vital functions, appointed incompetent cronies to positions of responsibility, and abandoned survivors for days on end.

The cost of these failures has been immense: lives lost or shattered, money wasted, a great city in ruins.

### I. What Happened

Hurricane Katrina dumped 10 inches of rain and hit the Louisiana shore with sustained winds in excess of 120 miles per hour. Katrina had dropped to a Category 3 storm by the time it hit and the eye missed downtown New Orleans, but at its height, Katrina was the sixth-strongest Atlantic hurricane ever recorded and the third-strongest to hit U.S. shores.

- More than 1,800 people died.<sup>1</sup> Some bodies still have not been identified.<sup>2</sup>
- Roughly 1.5 million people were displaced.<sup>3</sup> Nearly half a million have not returned.<sup>4</sup>
- Nearly 500,000 homes were destroyed or made uninhabitable.<sup>5</sup>
- More than 44,000 small businesses were damaged or destroyed; 220,000 jobs were lost.<sup>6</sup>

We'll never know how many lives might have been saved or how much property could have been preserved if our public agencies had been better prepared or more responsive. We do know that Hurricane Katrina, one of the greatest natural disasters in American history, became a catastrophe because of the systematic failure of a conservative government.

### A. Failure to Prepare

Hurricane Katrina was not unanticipated. The storm was similar to the “Hurricane Pam” disaster exercise created by state and federal authorities in July 2003 to prepare for what locals called “The Big One.”<sup>7</sup> In a five-day drill based on realistic weather and damage projections developed by the National Weather Service, the fictional Hurricane Pam brought sustained winds of 120 mph to southeast Louisiana, dropped up to 20 inches of rain and drove a storm surge over levees in the New Orleans area. The exercise contemplated the evacuation of more than one million residents and the destruction of 500,000-600,000 buildings.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considered Pam a success. “We made great progress this week in our preparedness efforts,” said FEMA Regional Director Ron Castleman after the exercise.<sup>8</sup> “Disaster response teams developed action plans in critical areas such as search and

rescue, medical care, sheltering, temporary housing, school restoration and debris management. These plans are essential for quick response to a hurricane but will also help in other emergencies.”

FEMA gave itself a passing grade and gave itself 60 days to “polish the action plans.” History, however, is judging FEMA differently.

In the words of one participant, the Pam exercise was not only useless, it was crippling. “The Federal Emergency Management Agency promised the moon and the stars. They promised to have 1,000,000 bottles of water per day coming into affected areas within 48 hours. They promised massive prestaging with water, ice, medical supplies and generators. Anything that was needed, they would have either in place as the storm hit or ready to move in immediately after...FEMA promised more than they could deliver. They cut off deeper, perhaps more meaningful discussion and planning by handing out empty promises.”<sup>9</sup>

Even as the exercise failed to adequately prepare for disaster, actions on the ground made disaster more likely. Legal protection of the wetlands that provide natural defenses for the region has been shrinking. Warnings about global climate change and the increasing frequency of storms have gone unheeded. More immediately, the Army Corps of Engineers’ budget for levee construction in New Orleans had been slashed.<sup>10</sup> The Emergency Management Chief of Jefferson Parish, Walter Maestri, lamented the loss but accepted it stoically. “It appears that the money has been moved in the president's budget to handle homeland security and the war in Iraq, and I suppose that's the price we pay.”<sup>11</sup>

**U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce  
DRAFT FINAL REPORT ON NEW ORLEANS**

*June 1, 2006*

The hurricane protection system in New Orleans and southeast Louisiana was a system in name only. The system’s performance was compromised by the incompleteness of the system, inconsistency in levels of protection, and the lack of redundancy....

Bureaucratic bungling also crippled the preparations. FEMA was downgraded from a cabinet-level agency and folded into the Department of Homeland Security. Its mission became refocused on terrorism, and many senior professionals left or were forced out. Eric Holdeman, director of the King County, Washington, Office of Emergency Management, who worked with FEMA during the Nisqually earthquake of February 2001, said the agency had been “systematically downgraded and all but dismantled.”<sup>12</sup>

Three days after landfall, President Bush told the audience of *Good Morning America*, “I don't think anyone anticipated the breach of the levees.”<sup>13</sup> This claim is simply untrue. The Bush administration had been forewarned; it failed to respond.

## B. Failure to Respond

Three days before Katrina struck, professionals at FEMA said they should be getting buses and getting people out of there.<sup>14</sup> “We could all see it coming, like a guided missile,” said Leo Bosner, an emergency management specialist with 26 years’ experience. “We, as staff members at the agency, felt helpless. We knew that major steps needed to be taken fast, but, for whatever reasons, they were not taken.”<sup>15</sup>

Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco expressed the idea differently on the third night after landfall. “Does anybody in this building know anything about buses?” she cried in the states’ emergency center in Baton Rouge.<sup>16</sup> The federal government had promised 500 buses to rescue people stranded in the Superdome and convention center. Approximately 24,000 people were in the buildings, two-thirds of them women, children, elderly or infirm. A chunk of the Superdome roof collapsed and the power failed, turning the building into a giant, lightless sauna. By the time buses arrived *six days after landfall*, some children were so dehydrated guards had to carry them out. The body count was 10 dead in the Superdome and 24 people dead in the convention center.<sup>17</sup>

- FEMA dispatched only 7 of its 28 search and rescue teams to the area before the storm hit and sent no additional rescue workers until after the hurricane had passed.
- 70% of the New Orleans area’s 53 nursing homes were not evacuated before the hurricane struck.
- The day before landfall, FEMA had stockpiled 2.7 million liters of water, 1.3 million meals and 17 million pounds of ice. While children died of dehydration in the Superdome, most of the supplies went to Alabama.

At times, FEMA seemed worse than useless; it was an actual obstacle to rescue. Hundreds of firefighters who had responded to a nationwide call for help were inexplicably held by FEMA in Atlanta for days of training on community relations and sexual harassment.

William Vines, former Mayor of Fort Smith, Arkansas, tried to deliver food and water to areas hit by the hurricane. He said FEMA halted two trailer trucks carrying thousands of bottles of fresh drinking water. “FEMA would not let the trucks unload,” he told the *New York Times*.<sup>18</sup> “The drivers were stuck for several days on the side of the road about 10 miles from Camp Beauregard. FEMA said we had to have a ‘tasker number.’ What in the world is a tasker number? I have no idea. It’s just paperwork, and it’s ridiculous.”

But the problems extended beyond just New Orleans. Roughly 1.5 million people were displaced. Many were absorbed in large numbers by places such as Houston and Dallas, and the rest were spread all through the country. Schools, churches, businesses and private individuals all found ways to accommodate them. But no plans were in place.

- **Rep. Thomas M. Davis**, Republican of Virginia, chairman of the special House committee investigating the hurricane response:<sup>19</sup>

"The president is still at his ranch, the vice president is still fly-fishing in Wyoming, the president's chief of staff is in Maine. In retrospect, don't you think it would have been better to pull together? They should have had better leadership. It is disengagement."
- **Department of Homeland Security, post 9/11 National Response Plan:**

"The end result is vastly improved coordination among federal, state, local and tribal organizations to help save lives and protect America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness and efficiency of incident management."

**C. Failure to Rebuild**

On September 15, 2005, after two weeks of what many considered a sluggish and indifferent response, President Bush stood in Jackson Square, New Orleans, and offered this pledge to the American people: "We will do what it takes, we will stay as long as it takes, to help citizens rebuild their communities and their lives. And all who question the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise again."

Rebuilding is obviously difficult but, despite the pledge, it has been plagued by inattention, incompetence and infighting. It has also been painfully slow. Due to disputes over the Iraq war and other spending, the bulk of the federal reconstruction funding was not approved until almost 10 months after the hurricane struck.<sup>20</sup>

- A special report by the Brookings Institution found that roughly one year after the storm:<sup>21</sup>
  - Approximately half of all bus and street car routes are up and running, but only 17% of buses are in use.
  - An estimated 278,000 workers have been displaced; 23% of whom remain unemployed.
  - Half of the major hospitals have reopened, but Charity Hospital, the primary hospital for the indigent and uninsured, has not.
  - Unemployment is 7.2% – higher than pre-Katrina and higher than Louisiana or the country as a whole (both 4.6%) – suggesting that returning residents do not find work.
  - 100,000 households still live in FEMA trailers.<sup>22</sup>

To the degree reconstruction is moving forward, it doesn't look like a restoration of the original Crescent City. It resembles a government-subsidized gentrification plan that rebuilds the classic, historic and poor sections of town with new homes that former residents can't afford.

"Only the best residents should return," U.S. Housing Secretary Alphonso Jackson told the *New Orleans Time Picayune*.<sup>23</sup> He says he is concerned about drugs and safety, but the word on the street is that the government is trying to keep poor black people out of New Orleans.

"Nobody wants the people in the projects to come back," former resident Judy Gorman told the *Baltimore Sun*.<sup>24</sup> "Look around. Everybody's back home but us." Her apartment building was barely touched by the flood and her second-floor unit is clean and dry. Outside, the power lines are humming with electricity. Gorman is eager to leave her string of temporary homes in Texas and bring her two children back to the neighborhood and friends they've known their whole lives.

Government officials will not let her return. They say it isn't safe and that some damage can't be seen.

"I'll come in and clean it out myself if they'll let me," said Derek Howard outside the vacant apartment where he lived with his wife and daughter.<sup>25</sup> "All the money that HUD and FEMA and the government is giving away? They got to have enough to come in here and fix things up so people can come home."

Yet when Howard and others in his position contact the city housing authority, they are asked to fill out a form stating whether they have a job. They can't return to look for work. They must be hired before they arrive, making it harder for poor residents to reestablish themselves. Such rules help to explain Jackson's prediction that New Orleans is "not going to be as black as it was for a long time, if ever again."<sup>26</sup>

**HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson**

"Only the best residents should return."

"New Orleans is not going to be as black as it was for a long time, if ever again..... I'm telling you, as HUD secretary and having been a developer and a planner, that's how it's going to be."

So far, the prediction is coming true. The Census Bureau found that as of January 1, 2006, the population of New Orleans had declined by 64%. Among returnees:<sup>27</sup>

- 54% of pre-storm residents were white; 68% of post-storm residents were white.
- The median household income rose from \$39,793 to \$43,447.

Finally, the Small Business Administration (SBA)'s disaster loan program – specifically created to provide urgent loans in time of crisis – created a deadline schedule that could not be met, rejected more loans than in any previous disaster, and was historically slow to actually process approved loans.

- By December 2005, of the 28,540 loan applications received by the SBA from the Gulf Coast, only 10% had been processed and only 3% received approval. As of May 2006, the SBA had denied approximately 11,500 Louisiana loan applications and approved about 11,400, but had distributed only 4,200 checks.<sup>28</sup>
- Legislative efforts by congressional Democrats to extend deadlines were turned back. The vote table in **Section IV** shows where representatives stood.

## II. When the Saints Don't Come Marching In

Katrina was a disaster waiting to happen. Disasters, by definition, overwhelm the capacity of state and local authorities. Disasters are times when the federal government needs to step in.

But the federal government has been captured by a conservative movement skeptical of its purposes and scornful of its operation. As a matter of ideological conviction, conservatives seek to shrink essential services and outsource core functions, and they appear to value profitability over performance. Katrina exposed the costs of catastrophic conservatism. The city was abandoned when it needed help; the people were abandoned when the storm destroyed their means of subsistence. This section shows how it happened.

### A. Shrinking Government

“Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”

*Ronald Reagan's first inaugural address, January 1981*

"My goal is to cut government in half in twenty-five years, to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub."

*Grover Norquist, Executive Director, Americans for Tax Reform.*

The modern conservative movement is united less by belief in small government – a traditional constitutional value – than by disdain for government. They don't just want to shrink it. They want to drown it in a bathtub. That's dangerous.

Individuals alone cannot build and maintain levees. Instead, individuals and business pay into a collective coffer – called a tax – and the taxes are used to build and maintain public goods like levees and dams. It's a collective effort for the common good.

Private industry made clear in the Katrina aftermath that they wouldn't return, wouldn't build and wouldn't reinvest until the government gave assurances that the levees would be maintained. Without that public promise, New Orleans would still be under water. That's part of what government is for.

It's not about big government or small government. It's about effective government. Instead of government that works, conservatives gave the citizens of New Orleans ideology.

- *Private school vouchers.* The conservative education package for displaced students created a controversial voucher program to provide massive federal funding for private

or parochial schools – at a time when public schools desperately needed resources to reopen.

- “*Race to the bottom*” capitalism. President Bush suspended the Davis-Bacon law requiring federal contractors to pay the prevailing wage – freeing major corporations to exploit people displaced from their homes and desperate for work during reconstruction.
  - Legislative efforts by congressional Democrats and moderate Republicans turned back the pay cut. The vote table in **Section IV** shows where representatives stood.
- *Estate tax*. The conservative Heritage Foundation even recommended using Hurricane Katrina to eliminate the estate tax. Its report, *From Tragedy to Triumph*, recommends: “Repeal the federal death (estate) tax and immediately exempt Katrina victims from paying death taxes.”<sup>29</sup> The report does not mention that the estate tax only applies to assets in excess of \$2 million. A quick look at the television suggests that few Katrina victims live at that asset level.
- *Anything but success*. Conservatives worked hard to avoid using HUD Section 8 housing vouchers, a well-tested, bug-free program for rental assistance that could be used to place people in any of the one million vacant apartments in the southeastern United States, including 50,000 vacant units in Dallas-Fort Worth alone.<sup>30</sup> Better to spend extra money and build FEMA-villes than admit that a social assistance program actually works.
  - On April Fools Day, 2006, FEMA and Congress were still trying to figure out what to do with more than 10,000 mobile homes hastily stockpiled in Hope, Arkansas, intended but never used for Katrina evacuees.<sup>31</sup>



- When emergency hotel vouchers for the displaced ran out and new systems were not established to replace them, Congress intervened to extend the voucher program. The table in **Section IV** shows where representatives stood on the issue.

## B. Cronyism

“Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job.”

*President Bush to FEMA Director Michael Brown in his official statement on hurricane relief September 2, 2005.*

If you don't believe in government – but you have hundreds of well-paying government positions waiting to be filled – you might as well hire your friends. The Bush administration, more focused on retaining power than on governing, made cronyism systemic.

Cronyism is directly implicated in the drowning of New Orleans. The newly inaugurated President Bush appointed his campaign manager, Joe Allbaugh, Director of FEMA in 2001. Maybe a disaster would arise, maybe not; the appointment shows how much the President cared. Allbaugh had no disaster management experience when he took the job, and he didn't seem interested in learning. He told Congress in May 2001 that FEMA may have evolved into an “oversized entitlement program” and that expectations for FEMA “may have ballooned beyond what is an appropriate level.”<sup>32</sup> The not-so-implicit suggestion of the new director was that perhaps FEMA could be cut back, and Congress followed his lead.

Allbaugh left when FEMA was absorbed in the Department of Homeland Security. With the administration newly obsessed with terrorism, Allbaugh left to put his political connections to work, starting a consulting firm that advises companies seeking to do business in Iraq. He was succeeded by his college friend Michael Brown, who also had no disaster management experience and who had just lost his job as a Commissioner of the International Arabian Horse Association.

The contrast to FEMA under the previous administration is stunning. President Clinton believed in government: he appointed as head of FEMA a disaster management expert, James Lee Witt, who created strategies to deal with large-scale disasters and to ensure continuity of government across jurisdictions and when communications failed. He managed the effective distribution of federal funds for preparedness and mitigation and coordinated responsibility across diverse government agencies and private organizations. When he departed, FEMA was a premier agency, ready and able to deal with disasters.

What Witt built had been dismantled by the time Katrina hit.<sup>33</sup> But blame goes beyond Allbaugh and Brown. The buck stops with the president who hired them and the Senate that confirmed them. The people needed a government that worked, but the government wasn't interested.

- *Connections needed.* As of March 2006, only 18% of FEMA contract dollars for Katrina and Rita reconstruction were awarded to companies in the hardest hit states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.<sup>34</sup>
- *Friendship before rescue.* FEMA ignored the American Bus Association's offer for buses after the storm. FEMA had a transportation contract with a trucking company whose boss was a major Republican Party fund-raiser, even though the contract had no provision to provide buses. This arrangement delayed evacuation by five days, costing countless lives and FEMA \$400 million.<sup>35</sup>

Cronyism slowed reconstruction too. Immediately after the hurricane, Bush appointed his political strategist Karl Rove to head the reconstruction. Rove's political skill is well known, but nobody has any reason to think he has a hidden skill at community development. Indeed, Rove's appointment indicated that reconstruction was political and that gentrification was deliberate, not market driven.

- Despite the SBA's trouble accepting and funding loans, President Bush gave the Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive to Herbert Mitchell, the SBA

Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance. The award gives Mitchell a bonus equal to 35% of his \$158,194 base pay.<sup>36</sup>

<b>Bush's Senior FEMA Staff</b> <sup>37</sup>	
<b>Name</b>	<b>Former Job</b>
— <b>Joe Allbaugh</b> , Bush's first FEMA director	— Bush-for-President Campaign Manager
— <b>Michael Brown</b> , Bush's second FEMA director	— Commissioner of the International Arabian Horse Association
— <b>Patrick Rhode</b> , Chief of Staff	— Bush-for-President campaign staff
— <b>Brooks Altshuler</b> , Deputy Chief of Staff	— Bush-for-President campaign staff
— <b>Scott Morris</b> , Deputy Chief of Staff	— Staff at Maverick Media, a Texas company that produced ads for the Bush-Cheney campaign.

"The Bush administration has apparently transformed FEMA from a professional, world-class emergency responder into a dumping ground for former campaign staff and political hacks." Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY).

### **C. Privatization**

"The best minds are not in government; if they were, business would steal them away."  
-Ronald Reagan

The conservative disdain for government drives them outside of government. The flip side of the belief that government does everything badly is the belief that the private sector does everything right. The result is overzealous privatization. And like cronyism, it's a chance to direct government resources to your friends.

The private sector does many things well but it requires careful attention. The goal of business is to make money. Private enterprise has as much incentive to cut corners as to do jobs well. Close supervision, defined strategies and clear goals are needed to make outsourcing work. Conservatives often lack the whole package.

- In the aftermath of Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security awarded roughly 3,400 contracts worth approximately \$5.3 billion.<sup>38</sup>
  - *No competitive bidding.* More than 1,000 contracts exceeded \$500,000. Less than half of these were competitively bid, so contractors did not have to prove they could deliver the best service at the lowest cost.

- *No local preference.* Contracts did not provide that locals be given first opportunity to rebuild their own community.
- Big corporations already working in Iraq scored new contracts for Katrina.
  - *Halliburton* received a total of \$125 million in reconstruction contracts within six weeks of landfall.<sup>39</sup>
  - *Blackwater* received \$33 million in government security contracts.<sup>40</sup> The federal government pays Blackwater \$950 per day for each of its guards in the area, but guards report that they are paid only \$350 a day.
  - *Titan Corporation* got contracts for relief work in New Orleans even as it defends lawsuits against its staff in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and after a federal inspector general concluded that taxpayers overpaid Titan on a \$229 million military contract in Iraq.<sup>41</sup>

Of course, some functions can be outsourced but responsibility cannot be. Homeowners do not contract for work and then turn their backs; they understand that supervision brings better results and compliance with the promised budget. The conservative disdain for government and their faith in the private sector invites disastrous results.

#### **D. Pay to Play**

"If you want to play in our revolution, you have to live by our rules."

*Tom Delay, just after the 1994 Republican revolution.*

"We've created a culture that just breeds corruption."

*Representative Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.)*

Since performance is irrelevant, money is the yardstick for success in conservative government. Legislators who raise money rise to the top. Those who can't fall farther and farther behind. Tom Delay's notorious K Street Project was all about using government money to reward campaign contributors in a mutually rewarding quest for power.

HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson put the priorities vividly on display after Katrina. At a Texas small business forum he told a story about denying a HUD contract after the company owner expressed doubts about President Bush. "Why should I reward someone who doesn't like the president?" Jackson asked. "So they can use funds to try to campaign against the president? That's the way I believe."<sup>42</sup>

Jackson later said he made up the story, but that doesn't answer the underlying questions. Did he really deny the contract? Or did he make up the story simply to warn potential contractors that only Bush supporters need apply? In either case, the story shows how a key conservative – an agency head appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate – understands the process: government awards contracts, and contractors use the money to pay back the government. The actual work doesn't even seem to be a consideration. It's about politics, not performance.

- Some of the biggest post-Katrina contracts went to Halliburton and Bechtel corporations, both closely aligned with Republicans.
  - Halliburton Corporation gives 91% of its PAC donations to Republicans.<sup>43</sup>
  - Bechtel Corporation gives 72% of its PAC donations to Republicans.<sup>44</sup>
  - Joe Allbaugh, Bush's former campaign manager, left his position as FEMA director to become a lobbyist for both corporations.

The conservative disdain for government is highlighted again by Katrina's damage to Louisiana's voting machinery. With primary elections on the horizon, some members of Congress tried to direct reconstruction funds towards the repair of the essential hardware of democracy. As the table in **Section IV** reveals, the effort was defeated almost along party lines.

### **III. Failed Promise**

Behind all the failures is a failed promise. In the wreckage of New Orleans, President Bush seemed to discover the problems of entrenched poverty in America. He promised not just to rebuild New Orleans but to address the problems behind the ruin.

It was a promise written on the wind. Since Katrina, the White House has advanced not a single program to redress poverty. Worse, it has pushed through appropriations that cut food stamps, Medicaid, and Pell Grants designed to help capable youth rise beyond their backgrounds. Katrina offered an opportunity to rebuild a city on a model of high road development – high wage, low waste, efficient use of energy – rather than “race to the bottom” capitalism. The opportunity is lost, not because of natural disaster, but because of catastrophic conservatism and its scorn for government purpose.

### **IV. Vote Record: Where They Stood**

Nature created the devastation; conservative failure created the catastrophe. There is plenty of blame to go round, but real responsibility goes to the broader ideology of conservatism and the right-wing, one-party rule in Washington, DC. The conservative ideology disdains government and values private enterprise above public purpose. The result in New Orleans was a human and moral catastrophe.

The following table shows important votes leading up to, and cleaning up from, catastrophe. The votes show how and where individual members of Congress rank on a scale of personal responsibility.

<b>Name</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Defended prevailing wage legislation</b>	<b>Facilitate SBA loan distribution</b>	<b>Extend emergency hotel vouchers</b>	<b>Repair voting machines before primary</b>
			(Davis-Bacon letter)	(HR 4939 Amd. 748, roll call #62)	(HR 4939 Amd. 749 roll call #63)	(HR 4939 Amd. 735 roll call #58)
Young, D. (AK-AL)	AK	R	Y	N	N	N
Aderholt (AL-04)	AL	R	N	N	N	N
Bachus, S. (AL-06)	AL	R	N	N	N	N
Bonner (AL-01)	AL	R	N	N	N	N
Cramer (AL-05)	AL	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Davis, A. (AL-07)	AL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Everett (AL-02)	AL	R	N	N	N	N
Rogers, Mike D. (AL-03)	AL	R	N	N	N	N
Berry (AR-01)	AR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Boozman (AR-03)	AR	R	N	N	N	N
Ross (AR-04)	AR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Snyder (AR-02)	AR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flake (AZ-06)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Franks, T. (AZ-02)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Grijalva (AZ-07)	AZ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hayworth (AZ-05)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Kolbe (AZ-08)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Pastor (AZ-04)	AZ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Renzi (AZ-01)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Shadegg (AZ-03)	AZ	R	N	N	N	N
Baca (CA-43)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Becerra (CA-31)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Berman (CA-28)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bono (CA-45)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Calvert (CA-44)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Campbell (CA-48)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Capps (CA-23)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cardoza (CA-18)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa (CA-20)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Davis, S. (CA-53)	CA	D	Y	NV	NV	NV
Doolittle (CA-04)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Dreier (CA-26)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Eshoo (CA-14)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Farr (CA-17)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Filner (CA-51)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Gallegly (CA-24)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Harman (CA-36)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Herger (CA-02)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Honda (CA-15)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hunter (CA-52)	CA	R	N	NV	N	N
Issa (CA-49)	CA	R	N	NV	N	N
Lantos (CA-12)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lee (CA-09)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lewis, Jerry (CA-41)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Lofgren (CA-16)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lungren (CA-03)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Matsui, D. (CA-05)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McKeon (CA-25)	CA	R	N	Y	N	N
Millender-McDonald (CA-37)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Miller, Gary (CA-42)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Miller, George (CA-07)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Napolitano (CA-38)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nunes (CA-21)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Pelosi (CA-08)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pombo (CA-11)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Radanovich (CA-19)	CA	R	N	NV	NV	N
Rohrabacher (CA-46)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Roybal-Allard (CA-34)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Royce (CA-40)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Sanchez, Linda (CA-39)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sanchez, Loretta (CA-47)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	N
Schiff (CA-29)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sherman (CA-27)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solis (CA-32)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stark (CA-13)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tauscher (CA-10)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thomas, B. (CA-22)	CA	R	N	N	N	N
Thompson, M. (CA-01)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waters (CA-35)	CA	D	Y	NV	Y	Y
Watson (CA-33)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waxman (CA-30)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woolsey (CA-06)	CA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Beauprez (CO-07)	CO	R	N	N	N	N
DeGette (CO-01)	CO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hefley (CO-05)	CO	R	N	N	N	N
Musgrave (CO-04)	CO	R	N	N	N	N
Salazar, J. (CO-03)	CO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Tancredo (CO-06)	CO	R	N	N	N	N
Udall, M. (CO-02)	CO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
DeLauro (CT-03)	CT	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, N. (CT-05)	CT	R	Y	N	N	N
Larson, J. (CT-01)	CT	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shays (CT-04)	CT	R	Y	N	N	N
Simmons (CT-02)	CT	R	Y	N	Y	N
Castle (DE-AL)	DE	R	N	N	N	N
Bilirakis (FL-09)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Boyd (FL-02)	FL	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Brown, C. (FL-03)	FL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown-Waite (FL-05)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Crenshaw (FL-04)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Davis, Jim (FL-11)	FL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Diaz-Balart, L. (FL-21)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Diaz-Balart, M. (FL-25)	FL	R	N	N	NV	N
Feeney (FL-24)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Foley (FL-16)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Harris (FL-13)	FL	R	N	N	NV	N
Hastings, A. (FL-23)	FL	D	Y	NV	NV	NV
Keller (FL-08)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Mack (FL-14)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Meek, K. (FL-17)	FL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mica (FL-07)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Miller, J. (FL-01)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Putnam (FL-12)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Shaw (FL-22)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Stearns (FL-06)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Wasserman-Schultz (FL-20)	FL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weldon, D. (FL-15)	FL	R	N	NV	N	N
Wexler (FL-19)	FL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Young, C.W. (FL-10)	FL	R	N	N	N	N
Barrow (GA-12)	GA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bishop, S. (GA-02)	GA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Deal (GA-10)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Gingrey (GA-11)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Kingston (GA-01)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Lewis, John (GA-05)	GA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Linder (GA-07)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Marshall (GA-03)	GA	D	Y	Y	N	Y
McKinney (GA-04)	GA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Norwood (GA-09)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Price, T. (GA-06)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Scott, D. (GA-13)	GA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Westmoreland (GA-08)	GA	R	N	N	N	N
Abercrombie (HI-01)	HI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Case (HI-02)	HI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Boswell (IA-03)	IA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
King, S. (IA-05)	IA	R	N	N	N	N
Latham (IA-04)	IA	R	N	N	N	N
Leach (IA-02)	IA	R	N	N	N	N
Nussle (IA-01)	IA	R	N	N	N	N
Otter (ID-01)	ID	R	N	N	N	N
Simpson (ID-02)	ID	R	N	N	N	N
Bean (IL-08)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Biggert (IL-13)	IL	R	N	N	N	N
Costello (IL-12)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Davis, D. (IL-07)	IL	D	Y	NV	NV	NV
Emanuel (IL-05)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Evans (IL-17) ?	IL	D	Y	NV	NV	NV
Gutierrez (IL-04)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hastert (IL-14) S	IL	R	N	NV	NV	NV
Hyde (IL-06)	IL	R	N	N	N	N
Jackson, J. (IL-02)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Timothy (IL-15)	IL	R	Y	N	N	N
Kirk (IL-10)	IL	R	Y	N	N	N
LaHood (IL-18)	IL	R	Y	N	N	N
Lipinski (IL-03)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Manzullo (IL-16)	IL	R	N	N	N	N
Rush (IL-01)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schakowsky (IL-09)	IL	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shimkus (IL-19)	IL	R	Y	NV	NV	N
Weller (IL-11)	IL	R	Y	N	N	N
Burton (IN-05)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Buyer (IN-04)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Carson, J. (IN-07)	IN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chocola (IN-02)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Hostettler (IN-08)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Pence (IN-06)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Sodrel (IN-09)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Souder (IN-03)	IN	R	N	N	N	N
Visclosky (IN-01)	IN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Moore, D. (KS-03)	KS	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Moran, Jerry (KS-01)	KS	R	N	N	N	N
Ryun, J. (KS-02)	KS	R	N	N	N	N
Tiahrt (KS-04)	KS	R	N	N	N	N
Chandler (KY-06)	KY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Davis, G. (KY-04)	KY	R	N	N	N	N
Lewis, R. (KY-02)	KY	R	N	NV	N	N
Northup (KY-03)	KY	R	N	N	N	N
Rogers, H. (KY-05)	KY	R	N	N	N	N
Whitfield (KY-01)	KY	R	N	N	N	N
Alexander, R. (LA-05)	LA	R	Y	N	N	N
Baker (LA-06)	LA	R	N	N	N	N
Boustany (LA-07)	LA	R	N	N	N	N
Jefferson (LA-02)	LA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jindal (LA-01)	LA	R	N	Y	Y	N
McCrery (LA-04)	LA	R	N	Y	N	N
Melancon (LA-03)	LA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Capuano (MA-08)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Delahunt (MA-10)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Frank, B. (MA-04)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lynch (MA-09)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Markey (MA-07)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McGovern (MA-03)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Meehan (MA-05)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Neal (MA-02)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Olver (MA-01)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tierney (MA-06)	MA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bartlett (MD-06)	MD	R	N	N	N	N
Cardin (MD-03)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cummings (MD-07)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gilchrest (MD-01)	MD	R	N	N	N	N
Hoyer (MD-05)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ruppersberger (MD-02)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Van Hollen (MD-08)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wynn (MD-04)	MD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Allen, T. (ME-01)	ME	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Michaud (ME-02)	ME	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Camp (MI-04)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Conyers (MI-14)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dingell (MI-15)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ehlers (MI-03)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Hoekstra (MI-02)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Kildee (MI-05)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Kilpatrick (MI-13)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Knollenberg (MI-09)	MI	R	N	N	N	NV
Levin, S. (MI-12)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McCotter (MI-11)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Miller, C. (MI-10)	MI	R	Y	N	N	N
Rogers, Mike (MI-08)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Schwarz, J. (MI-07)	MI	R	Y	N	N	N
Stupak (MI-01)	MI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Upton (MI-06)	MI	R	N	N	N	N
Gutknecht (MN-01)	MN	R	N	N	N	N
Kennedy, M. (MN-06)	MN	R	N	N	N	N
Kline (MN-02)	MN	R	N	N	N	N
McCollum (MN-04)	MN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oberstar (MN-08)	MN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peterson, C. (MN-07)	MN	D	Y	Y	N	N
Ramstad (MN-03)	MN	R	N	N	N	N
Sabo (MN-05)	MN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Akin (MO-02)	MO	R	N	N	N	N
Blunt (MO-07)	MO	R	N	N	N	N
Carnahan (MO-03)	MO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clay (MO-01)	MO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cleaver (MO-05)	MO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Emerson (MO-08)	MO	R	N	N	N	N
Graves (MO-06)	MO	R	N	N	N	N
Hulshof (MO-09)	MO	R	N	N	N	N
Skelton (MO-04)	MO	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pickering (MS-03)	MS	R	N	N	N	N
Taylor, G. (MS-04)	MS	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Thompson, B. (MS-02)	MS	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wicker (MS-01)	MS	R	N	N	N	N
Rehberg (MT-AL)	MT	R	N	N	N	N
Butterfield (NC-01)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Coble (NC-06)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
Etheridge (NC-02)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Foxx (NC-05)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
Hayes (NC-08)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
Jones, W. (NC-03)	NC	R	N	Y	N	N
McHenry (NC-10)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
McIntyre (NC-07)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Miller, B. (NC-13)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Myrick (NC-09)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
Price, D. (NC-04)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Taylor, C. (NC-11)	NC	R	N	N	N	N
Watt (NC-12)	NC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pomeroy (ND-AL)	ND	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fortenberry (NE-01)	NE	R	N	N	N	N
Osborne (NE-03)	NE	R	N	N	N	N
Terry (NE-02)	NE	R	N	N	N	N
Bass (NH-02)	NH	R	N	N	N	N
Bradley (NH-01)	NH	R	N	N	N	N
Andrews (NJ-01)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ferguson (NJ-07)	NJ	R	Y	N	N	N
Frelinghuysen (NJ-11)	NJ	R	N	N	N	N
Garrett (NJ-05)	NJ	R	N	N	N	N
Holt (NJ-12)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
LoBiondo (NJ-02)	NJ	R	Y	N	N	N
Pallone (NJ-06)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pascrell (NJ-08)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Payne (NJ-10)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rothman (NJ-09)	NJ	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saxton (NJ-03)	NJ	R	Y	N	N	N
Smith, C. (NJ-04)	NJ	R	Y	N	N	N
Pearce (NM-02)	NM	R	N	N	N	N
Udall, T. (NM-03)	NM	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wilson, H. (NM-01)	NM	R	N	N	N	N
Berkley (NV-01)	NV	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gibbons (NV-02)	NV	R	N	N	N	N
Porter (NV-03)	NV	R	N	Y	N	N
Ackerman (NY-05)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bishop, T. (NY-01)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Boehlert (NY-24)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
Crowley (NY-07)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Engel (NY-17)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fossella (NY-13)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
Higgins (NY-27)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hinchey (NY-22)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Israel (NY-02)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kelly (NY-19)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
King, P. (NY-03)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
Kuhl (NY-29)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
Lowey (NY-18)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maloney (NY-14)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McCarthy (NY-04)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McHugh (NY-23)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N

McNulty (NY-21)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Meeks, G. (NY-06)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nadler (NY-08)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Owens (NY-11)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rangel (NY-15)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reynolds (NY-26)	NY	R	N	N	N	N
Serrano (NY-16)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Slaughter (NY-28)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweeney (NY-20)	NY	R	Y	NV	NV	NV
Towns (NY-10)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Velazquez (NY-12)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Walsh (NY-25)	NY	R	Y	N	N	N
Weiner (NY-09)	NY	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Boehner (OH-08)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Brown, S. (OH-13)	OH	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chabot (OH-01)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Gillmor (OH-05)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Hobson (OH-07)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Jones, S. (OH-11)	OH	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kaptur (OH-09)	OH	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kucinich (OH-10)	OH	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
LaTourette (OH-14)	OH	R	Y	N	N	N
Ney (OH-18)	OH	R	Y	N	N	Y
Oxley (OH-04)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Pryce, D. (OH-15)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Regula (OH-16)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Ryan, T. (OH-17)	OH	D	Y	NV	Y	Y
Schmidt (OH-02)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Strickland (OH-06)	OH	D	Y	Y	Y	NV
Tiberi (OH-12)	OH	R	N	N	N	N
Turner (OH-03)	OH	R	Y	N	N	N
Boren (OK-02)	OK	D	Y	NV	NV	NV
Cole (OK-04)	OK	R	N	N	N	N
Istook (OK-05)	OK	R	N	N	N	N
Lucas (OK-03)	OK	R	N	N	N	N
Sullivan (OK-01)	OK	R	N	N	N	N
Blumenauer (OR-03)	OR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
DeFazio (OR-04)	OR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hooley (OR-05)	OR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Walden (OR-02)	OR	R	Y	N	N	N
Wu (OR-01)	OR	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brady, R. (PA-01)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Dent (PA-15)	PA	R	N	N	N	N
Doyle (PA-14)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
English (PA-03)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Fattah (PA-02)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fitzpatrick (PA-08)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Gerlach (PA-06)	PA	R	Y	Y	N	N
Hart (PA-04)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Holden (PA-17)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kanjorski (PA-11)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Murphy (PA-18)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Murtha (PA-12)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peterson, J. (PA-05)	PA	R	N	N	N	N
Pitts (PA-16)	PA	R	N	N	N	N
Platts (PA-19)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Schwartz, A. (PA-13)	PA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sherwood (PA-10)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Shuster (PA-09)	PA	R	N	N	N	N
Weldon, C. (PA-07)	PA	R	Y	N	N	N
Kennedy, P. (RI-01)	RI	D	Y	NV	Y	Y
Langevin (RI-02)	RI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barrett (SC-03)	SC	R	N	N	N	N
Brown, H. (SC-01)	SC	R	N	N	N	N
Clyburn (SC-06)	SC	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Inglis (SC-04)	SC	R	N	N	N	N
Spratt (SC-05)	SC	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Wilson, J. (SC-02)	SC	R	N	N	N	N
Herseth (SD-AL)	SD	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Blackburn (TN-07)	TN	R	N	N	N	N
Cooper (TN-05)	TN	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Davis, L. (TN-04)	TN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Duncan (TN-02)	TN	R	N	NV	NV	NV
Ford (TN-09)	TN	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gordon (TN-06)	TN	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Jenkins (TN-01)	TN	R	N	N	N	N
Tanner (TN-08)	TN	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Wamp (TN-03)	TN	R	N	N	N	N
Barton (TX-06)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Bonilla (TX-23)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Brady, K. (TX-08)	TX	R	N	Y	N	N
Burgess (TX-26)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Carter (TX-31)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Conaway (TX-11)	TX	R	N	N	N	N

Cuellar (TX-28)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Culberson (TX-07)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
DeLay (TX-22)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Doggett (TX-25)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Edwards (TX-17)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gohmert (TX-01)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Gonzalez (TX-20)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Granger (TX-12)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Green, A. (TX-09)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Green, G. (TX-29)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hall, R. (TX-04)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Hensarling (TX-05)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Hinojosa (TX-15)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jackson-Lee, S. (TX-18)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, E.B. (TX-30)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Sam (TX-03)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Marchant (TX-24)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
McCaul (TX-10)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Neugebauer (TX-19)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Ortiz (TX-27)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Paul (TX-14)	TX	R	N	Y	N	N
Poe (TX-02)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Reyes (TX-16)	TX	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sessions, P. (TX-32)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Smith, L. (TX-21)	TX	R	N	N	NV	N
Thornberry (TX-13)	TX	R	N	N	N	N
Bishop, R. (UT-01)	UT	R	N	N	N	N
Cannon (UT-03)	UT	R	N	N	N	N
Matheson (UT-02)	UT	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Boucher (VA-09)	VA	D	Y	Y	N	Y
Cantor (VA-07)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Davis, Jo Ann (VA-01)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Davis, T. (VA-11)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Drake (VA-02)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Forbes (VA-04)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Goode (VA-05)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Goodlatte (VA-06)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Moran, James (VA-08)	VA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Scott, R. (VA-03)	VA	D	Y	Y	Y	NV
Wolf (VA-10)	VA	R	N	N	N	N
Sanders (VT-AL)	VT	I	NV	Y	Y	NV
Baird (WA-03)	WA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y

Dicks (WA-06)	WA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hastings, D. (WA-04)	WA	R	N	N	N	N
Inslee (WA-01)	WA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Larsen, R. (WA-02)	WA	D	Y	NV	Y	Y
McDermott (WA-07)	WA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
McMorris (WA-05)	WA	R	N	NV	NV	N
Reichert (WA-08)	WA	R	N	N	Y	N
Smith, A. (WA-09)	WA	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Baldwin (WI-02)	WI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Green, M. (WI-08)	WI	R	N	N	N	N
Kind (WI-03)	WI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Moore, G. (WI-04)	WI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obey (WI-07)	WI	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Petri (WI-06)	WI	R	N	N	N	N
Ryan, P. (WI-01)	WI	R	N	N	N	N
Sensenbrenner (WI-05)	WI	R	N	N	N	NV
Capito (WV-02)	WV	R	N	N	N	N
Mollohan (WV-01)	WV	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rahall (WV-03)	WV	D	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cubin (WY-AL)	WY	R	N	N	N	N

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